Slobodan Milosevic Opinions

[UCBeau]

I would have to direct you to each President's advisors. Strategically Europe has been important to the US, Africa has not. Maybe something/someones in Europe were asking for intervention. Since you seem to know please enlighten us.

He can't enlighten us because he has no clue.

 

[DaleM]

He can't enlighten us because he has no clue.

Oh master of the obvious, you shall lead us all to where we are going!

 

[UCBeau]

Someone's gotta lead the flock to water.

 

[05 Roush]

Have you guys even gone out and done your own research other than what Connie Chung and President Bush has told you???

Answer these questions, then we'll talk:

1. How come we engaged this man in 1969?
2. Why was Saddam good buddies with the U.S. from 1980-1984???
3. What was the real reason why Saddam Invaded Kuwait to begin with?
4. Where are the WMD's that we're still looking for?

Is Saddam a ruthless dictator? Of course. But if that's the reason why we removed him, how come all the other more sinister ones are being completely overlooked?

 

[DaleM]

Have you guys even gone out and done your own research other than what Connie Chung and President Bush has told you???

Answer these questions, then we'll talk:

1. How come we engaged this man in 1969?
2. Why was Saddam good buddies with the U.S. from 1980-1984???
3. What was the real reason why Saddam Invaded Kuwait to begin with?
4. Where are the WMD's that we're still looking for?

If you did the research why ask all the old and dumb questions:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/saddam.htm
1. he was coming to power and we seen it, trying to establish links with a new leader.
2. He was using WMDs on Iranians and we liked that.
3. he thought our non response of tacit approval, he was wrong.
4. he got rid of them, see 2.

 

[05 Roush]

You only answered one of the questions right.

Nice try though.

 

[DaleM]

You only answered one of the questions right.

Nice try though.

And you answered nothing. At least someone is trying.

 

[05 Roush]

And you answered nothing. At least someone is trying.

Man I really hate having to wipe some of your tushies for you. I'll do one at a time so you don't get confused.

Reason for Iraq invading Kuwait:

On July 16, a meeting of OPEC ("Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries") in Geneva ended with Iraq once more threatening military force against Kuwait for exceeding production quotas and for violating the agreement on drilling rights in the Rumaila oil field, a banana shaped area spanning both sides of the common border. Iraq charged Kuwait with cheating: taking more than its fair share of the oil in the field by using slant drilling techniques. Iraq further complained that Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates had refused to cancel Iraq’s debts from its war with Iran.

The next day, July 17, Saddam threatened to use force against any Arab oil exporters who refused to abide by their production quotas. The day after this threat, July 18, Saddam massed 30,000 Iraqi troops on his border with Kuwait. The U.S. Senate voted sanctions against Iraq.

On July 25, Egypt reported that Saddam was willing to settle his differences with Kuwait peacefully. The same day, Saddam was told by U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, in a meeting in Baghdad that the United States had "no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait."

Iraqi and Kuwaiti emissaries held talks in Jedda, Saudi Arabia on July 31 and August 1, but the talks collapsed when Kuwait reportedly refused to write off billions of dollars of Iraqi war debts and relinquish disputed territory.

On August 2, at two in the morning, Iraqi forces swept into Kuwait. Resistance from Kuwait was minimal. The ruling al-Sabah family fled and Kuwait fell under Iraqi control. The next day, Iraqi forces massed along the border between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in an area called the "Neutral Zone." Saddam later claimed that his positions there were "defensive" only, and that he had never intended to invade Saudi Arabia with whom he had signed a mutual non-aggression pact.

http://www.nmhschool.org/tthornton/mehistorydatabase/gulf_war.htm

 

[05 Roush]

Why the U.S. was buddy buddies between 1980 and 1984:

Initially, Iraq advanced far into Iranian territory, but was driven back within months. By mid-1982, Iraq was on the defensive against Iranian human-wave attacks. The U.S., having decided that an Iranian victory would not serve its interests, began supporting Iraq: measures already underway to upgrade U.S.-Iraq relations were accelerated, high-level officials exchanged visits, and in February 1982 the State Department removed Iraq from its list of states supporting international terrorism. (It had been included several years earlier because of ties with several Palestinian nationalist groups, not Islamicists sharing the worldview of al-Qaeda. Activism by Iraq's main Shiite Islamicist opposition group, al-Dawa, was a major factor precipitating the war -- stirred by Iran's Islamic revolution, its endeavors included the attempted assassination of Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz.)

Prolonging the war was phenomenally expensive. Iraq received massive external financial support from the Gulf states, and assistance through loan programs from the U.S. The White House and State Department pressured the Export-Import Bank to provide Iraq with financing, to enhance its credit standing and enable it to obtain loans from other international financial institutions. The U.S. Agriculture Department provided taxpayer-guaranteed loans for purchases of American commodities, to the satisfaction of U.S. grain exporters.

The U.S. restored formal relations with Iraq in November 1984, but the U.S. had begun, several years earlier, to provide it with intelligence and military support (in secret and contrary to this country's official neutrality) in accordance with policy directives from President Ronald Reagan. These were prepared pursuant to his March 1982 National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM 4-82) asking for a review of U.S. policy toward the Middle East.

......

By the summer of 1983 Iran had been reporting Iraqi use of using chemical weapons for some time. The Geneva protocol requires that the international community respond to chemical warfare, but a diplomatically isolated Iran received only a muted response to its complaints [Note 1]. It intensified its accusations in October 1983, however, and in November asked for a United Nations Security Council investigation.

The U.S., which followed developments in the Iran-Iraq war with extraordinary intensity, had intelligence confirming Iran's accusations, and describing Iraq's "almost daily" use of chemical weapons, concurrent with its policy review and decision to support Iraq in the war [Document 24]. The intelligence indicated that Iraq used chemical weapons against Iranian forces, and, according to a November 1983 memo, against "Kurdish insurgents" as well [Document 25].

What was the Reagan administration's response? A State Department account indicates that the administration had decided to limit its "efforts against the Iraqi CW program to close monitoring because of our strict neutrality in the Gulf war, the sensitivity of sources, and the low probability of achieving desired results." But the department noted in late November 1983 that "with the essential assistance of foreign firms, Iraq ha[d] become able to deploy and use CW and probably has built up large reserves of CW for further use. Given its desperation to end the war, Iraq may again use lethal or incapacitating CW, particularly if Iran threatens to break through Iraqi lines in a large-scale attack" [Document 25]. The State Department argued that the U.S. needed to respond in some way to maintain the credibility of its official opposition to chemical warfare, and recommended that the National Security Council discuss the issue.

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/

*Excerpts are from declassified information.

 

[DaleM]

So far I'm batting 1000 and used short sentences.

 

[05 Roush]

Insight to why the US/UK was pursuing Saddam:

First, Information on Saddam in 1969:

1969 - Already a central figure in the Baath Party, Hussein becomes the dominant force. He is confirmed as deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, made deputy to the president and deputy secretary-general of the Baath Party Regional Command (the party's executive), and placed in charge of internal security. As deputy president, Hussein also takes control of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission.

On 27 January Hussein organises the public hanging of 11 opponents accused of being Israeli spies.

On 9 November he personally directs attempts to accommodate the wishes of the Kurdish minority in Iraq's north for self-government.

http://www.moreorless.au.com/killers/hussein.html

Yet on December of 1969, here's what the British government had to say:

The British ambassador to Baghdad wrote this fascinating assessment of Saddam Hussein soon after his "emergence into the limelight" as "the recognized heir-apparent" of the Iraqi president in November 1969. At first, Hussein comes across as "singularly reserved" but eventually begins to speak "with great warmth and what certainly seemed sincerity" about various subjects. He insists Iraq's relationship with the Soviet bloc "was forced upon it by the central problem of Palestine," and he reveals an apparently "earnest" hope for improved ties with Britain - "and with America too for that matter." Paragraph 7 of the ambassador's account provides a remarkable portrait of Hussein - "young," with an "engaging smile," "a formidable, single-minded and hard-headed member of the Ba'athist hierarchy, but one with whom, if only one could see more of him, it would be possible to do business."

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB107/

The relationship with the U.S. and Iraq strengthen throughout the 70's.

 

[05 Roush]

So far I'm batting 1000 and used short sentences.

A half-assed answer is always wrong.

 

[DaleM]

A half-assed answer is always wrong.

Still batting 1000.
Another point many forget is the spectre of communism, 1969 and us at war in the Pacific had us hugging anyone not commie. I'm sure Reagan's anti-commie feelings never came into any of his decisions!

 

[05 Roush]

Also, we did not like Iraq using WMD's, but for some reason continued the relationship:

Document 5: Cable from U.S. Interests Section Baghdad to State Department, "Ismet Kittani's Reaction to US Chemical Weapons Statement and Next Steps in US-Iraq Relations," March 7, 1984
Source: Freedom of Information request.

On March 5, 1984, the State Department issued a public statement criticizing Iraq for using chemical weapons in violation of the Geneva accords. This cable describes Iraq's behind-the-scenes reaction delivered by Iraqi Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs Ismet Kittani to William Eagleton, head of the U.S. Interests Section in Baghdad. Kittani's complaint has less to do with the substance of the statement than with Washington's "timing and ... manner" of delivering it. Kittani's sophistication in the use of diplomatic techniques to soften the impact of public criticism, and his awareness of the importance of the media are notable. The bottom line for both sides is that the incident should not stand in the way of improving bilateral relations; formal diplomatic recognition followed in November 1984.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made two trips to Baghdad as Ronald Reagan's special Middle East envoy. The first visit took place in December 1983 (see the National Security Archive's electronic briefing book, "Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein"), the second in March 1984. This cable offers Rumsfeld some background information in advance of the latter visit, and includes the suggestion that he reinforce the message delivered by Secretary of State Shultz and Under Secretary Eagleburger in their March 15 meeting with Iraqi Under Secretary Kittani (previous document). The cable indicates Kittani remains "unpersuaded" by private U.S. assertions that the recent public statement against Iraq's chemical weapons use was necessitated "by our strong opposition to the use of lethal and incapacitating CW, wherever it occurs." The State Department wants to reassure Baghdad of its interest in improving bilateral ties "at a pace of Iraq's choosing." The Department tells Rumsfeld, "If Saddam or Tariq Aziz receives you . . . it will be a noteworthy gesture of the GOI's [Government of Iraq's] interest in keeping our relations on track." On March 26, Tariq Aziz received Rumsfeld during a brief, six-hour visit to Iraq. (National Security Archive freedom of information requests related to this meeting are still outstanding.) The cable also makes a passing reference to Saddam Hussein's "support and sanctuary for the Abu Nidhal [sic] terrorists" but gives no indication that Rumsfeld should raise the subject with the Iraqis or that it might stand in the way of warmer relations with Baghdad. One version of this document was previously published as Document 48 in "Shaking Hands with Saddam," but that version was entirely missing the second page with the crucial instruction to Rumsfeld that U.S. interests in improving U.S.-Iraq ties "remain undiminished" despite revelations of Iraq's use of chemical weapons.

 

[DaleM]

Also, we did not like Iraq using WMD's, but for some reason continued the relationship:

because we really liked him killing Iranians after the shame Carter lead us into.

 

[DaleM]

Say one thing do another?

 

[05 Roush]

Say one thing do another?

Well, if the shoe fits. It's just interesting how many people in this country don't know the entire history and just assume he's the only bad guy out there. And to add salt to the wounds the U.S. completely overlooks these guys:

http://www.parade.com/articles/editions/2006/edition_01-22-2006/Dictators

I guess we just go after our buddy dictators because they're easy pickins.

 

[DaleM]

Well, if the shoe fits. It's just interesting how many people in this country don't know the entire history and just assume he's the only bad guy out there. And to add salt to the wounds the U.S. completely overlooks these guys:

http://www.parade.com/articles/editions/2006/edition_01-22-2006/Dictators

I guess we just go after our buddy dictators because they're easy pickins.

I think we prioritize our dictators we crush and we tolerate. South America had us turning a blind eye that eventually lead to some people revolutions that still nip at us today. Damn Yankees.

Imagine if you will. After 9/11 Saddam providing WMD to a group and them striking us. Would everyone be cursing the President. Saddam had the means and the motive, he did try and assassinate President GHW Bush. I think the administration had decided not to take that gamble.

 

[05 Roush]

Well, one thing's for certain, this problem began as far back as 1963 when the Ba'ath party was slingshot into power in Iraq by the CIA (under direction of J. Edgar Hoover).

Ties go way back and one could argue the U.S. had been prepping Saddam for power well before 1979. Much like Noriega, oust the dictator and any secrets die with his regime.

 

[DaleM]

Well, one thing's for certain, this problem began as far back as 1963 when the Ba'ath party was slingshot into power in Iraq by the CIA (under direction of J. Edgar Hoover).

Ties go way back and one could argue the U.S. had been prepping Saddam for power well before 1979. Much like Noriega, oust the dictator and any secrets die with his regime.

Saddam was more in the right place at the right time. Here is what got the Baath into power(THE IDEA OF THEM BEING PRO-SOVIET AND CONTROLLING VAST OIL RESERVES):
He (Qasim) had taken Iraq out of the anti-Soviet Baghdad Pact. In 1961, he threatened to occupy Kuwait and nationalized part of the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), the foreign oil consortium that exploited Iraq's oil.

Saddam was the recipient of Bakr's misfortunes. Health and family tragedies.